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Classroom activity · Epistemology

Knowledge or a lucky guess?

Being right is not always the same as knowing. Use four everyday cases to explain the difference.

15 minutesIntroductory philosophyPairs or small groupsNo prior reading required

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Start with a claim. This activity concerns knowing that something is the case—for example, that it is 3:00 p.m. It does not try to cover every meaning of “know,” such as knowing a person or knowing how to swim.

Three questions to keep separate

1 · BELIEF

Does the person accept the claim as true? Confidence tells us about the person’s belief; it does not establish the fact.

2 · TRUTH

Is the claim actually true in the case as described? A sincerely held belief can still be false.

3 · JUSTIFICATION

What reason supports the belief? A familiar, normally reliable clock is a different basis from a guess.

“Justified true belief” is a useful starting account of knowledge, but it faces counterexamples. The final case asks whether these three conditions are enough.

Read, decide, explain

Take two minutes to read the cases, six minutes to discuss them in pairs, and five minutes to compare reasons as a class. Use the final two minutes for the exit question.

CASE 1

A working clock

Maya checks a library clock that she regularly uses and has good reason to trust. It is working correctly today. It shows 3:00 p.m., and it really is 3:00 p.m. Maya believes that it is 3:00 p.m.

What makes this an ordinary candidate for knowledge? Does Maya need to prove that error is impossible?

CASE 2

A lucky guess

Jon has no clock, no view outside and no information about the time. He simply guesses that it is 3:00 p.m. and comes to believe his guess. By coincidence, it is 3:00 p.m.

Jon and Maya hold the same true belief. What difference in how they reached it matters?

CASE 3

Confident, but mistaken

Leah reads a familiar clock showing 3:00 p.m. She is certain it is correct, but it is running ten minutes slow. It is actually 3:10 p.m. She believes that it is 3:00 p.m.

Which condition fails, even if Leah has a reasonable basis for trusting the clock?

CASE 4

A stopped clock

Sam checks a clock that has always been accurate and is normally well maintained. Unknown to Sam, it stopped at 3:00 earlier. Sam happens to look at it at exactly 3:00 p.m. Sam believes that it is 3:00 p.m.; this belief is true.

If Sam has the same apparent reason as Maya, is Sam’s true belief knowledge? Explain the role of luck.

Exit question

Change one fact in the stopped-clock case so that Sam’s belief becomes a better candidate for knowledge. Explain why your change helps, rather than simply making Sam more confident.

Teaching notes and suggested discussion

Teaching notes

Learning aim: students distinguish belief, truth and justification, then explain why a belief can meet the familiar three-part test yet seem true through luck. Assess the reasons students offer, not just their yes/no verdicts.

1 · The working clock

Belief and truth are present, with an ordinary reliable basis. Many everyday and fallibilist accounts treat this as knowledge. This is not a proof against skepticism, nor does it settle what every philosophical theory requires. Ask students whether ordinary knowledge must eliminate every conceivable possibility of error.

2 · The lucky guess

Belief and truth are present; the case supplies no supporting reason or reliable method. The guess is true by coincidence. Students should identify this missing basis rather than say merely that Jon lacks confidence.

3 · The mistaken belief

The proposition “it is 3:00 p.m.” is false, so the standard truth condition fails. Leah’s sincerity does not make it true. Whether her belief is justified is a separate question; justification can be fallible on many accounts.

4 · The stopped clock

This is a familiar example of the problem often discussed alongside Gettier cases. On an account that judges justification by Sam’s available reasons, Sam appears to have a justified true belief. Many readers nevertheless deny knowledge because the truth is an accidental match: the same clock would give the same answer when the time is wrong. The stopped-clock example predates Gettier’s 1963 paper; it is not one of the two examples in that paper.

Some theories assess justification partly through reliability and may question whether Sam is justified at all. Let students state that alternative, but ask them to explain what it changes. The exercise does not establish one universally accepted analysis of knowledge.

Discuss the change

A useful revision might give Sam a second, functioning time source and a good basis for trusting it. “Sam feels completely certain” changes confidence, not the faulty connection to the time. “Sam checks the same stopped clock twice” usually preserves the problem. Students may invent another solution if they explain how it reduces the relevant luck.

Two misunderstandings to catch

  • “Nobody can know anything.” A counterexample to one account of knowledge does not, by itself, establish global skepticism.
  • “Knowledge means justified true belief plus luck.” Here luck creates the challenge. Philosophers disagree about how best to explain or rule out the troublesome kind of luck.

Sources and further reading

The explanations and classroom wording above are original. The conceptual distinctions and stopped-clock discussion draw on these references, checked on 29 October 2026.

  1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: The Analysis of Knowledge — the justified-true-belief account, counterexamples, epistemic luck and competing approaches.
  2. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Epistemology — propositional knowledge and the stopped-clock example in the Gettier-problem discussion.
  3. OpenStax, Introduction to Philosophy, §7.2: Knowledge — an introductory explanation of the traditional account and Russell’s earlier stopped-clock example.

Continue with knowledge, compare knowledge and belief, or explore a map of philosophical questions.